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Abstract
Environmental stressors such as noise, pollution, extreme temperatures, or crowd-
ing can pose relevant externalities in the economy if certain conditions are met. This
paper presents experimental evidence that exposure to acute ambient noise decreases
cooperative behavior in a standard linear public good game.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, economics has been abstracting economic behavior from the influence of
environmental stressors1 on humans, much as it used to do for the influence of moods
and emotions (Kirchsteiger et al. 2006). In particular, researchers have assumed either
that individual preferences are invariant to any impact of environmental stress or that
the potential effect on preferences is stochastic and negligible. Environmental stressors
may become relevant to economics, however, if three conditions are fulfilled: (1) The
effect of environmental stressors on economic behavior is significant, (2) the ambient
levels of environmental stressors are subject to (permanent) change (Rabin 1998),2 and
(3) adaptation of humans to altered levels is imperfect or costly.
∗The author thanks Magdalena Buckert, Timo Goeschl, Andreas Lange, and Christiane Schwieren
for helpful comments. Funding by the German Science Foundation under grant GO1604/1 is gratefully
acknowledged.
†Email: diederich@eco.uni-heidelberg.de. Postal address: Department of Economics, Bergheimer Str.
20, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany.
1Noise, air pollution, extreme temperatures, and crowding have been typically subsumed under envi-
ronmental stressors (Evans 1984).
2For example, the populations of industrialized countries have been subject to considerable variations
in ambient levels of noise, pollution, and crowding for the past two centuries, especially in urban areas.
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As a first step to this agenda, this paper addresses condition (1) and tests for an
aftereffect of acute noise exposure on cooperative behavior in a standard linear public
good experiment. One reason for investigating noise among the available set of envi-
ronmental stressors is that it has been suggested to be the most important stressor for
conditions of environmental overload (Moser 1988). To my knowledge, neither noise
nor other environmental stressors have been subject to systematic research in economic
experiments so far. While I am therefore not aware of previous results regarding an ef-
fect of ambient noise on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, such as the voluntary
provision of public goods, the psychological literature reports that acute exposure to
noise reduces helping behavior, both in laboratory (Glass and Singer 1972, Sherrod and
Downs 1974) and in field experiments (Page 1977, Moser 1988). Helping behavior and
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas are related in that altruism has been suggested
to be a major motivational driver for behavior in both situations (e.g. Andreoni 2006).
Thus, assuming that exposure to noise affects the altruistic component of motivation, the
immediate hypothesis for the question of an effect of noise in a public good experiment
is that observed cooperation will decline.
The literature also provides evidence for the opposite hypothesis, however, if one
takes into account possible physiological pathways mediating the potential effect of noise
on cooperation. Traditionally, the effects of environmental stressors have been linked to
physiological stress. Thus, one immediately plausible mechanism would be that noise
produces physiological stress, and that physiological stress affects cooperative behavior
or altruism. Regarding the first part of this pathway, the early literature on environ-
mental stressors, which focused on behavioral measures of physiological stress, found
that noise decreases frustration tolerance and attention (Glass and Singer 1972, Sherrod
and Downs 1974, Page 1977). Evidence on a link of noise and physiological measures of
stress, which are typically elevations in the cardiovascular and neuroendocrine systems,
is more rare. A meta study by Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) on the effect of various
psychological stressors on the stress hormone cortisol does not find a significant effect
for noise. However, as the authors note, the sample size is small in the case of noise
(n=6). A result where physiological stress from noise could be identified is the “effort-
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by-stress tradeoff” (Tafalla and Evans 1997, Evans and Cohen 2004): Noise increases
norepinephrine and cortisol levels in a laboratory setting if accompanied with high effort
to complete a simultaneous task. At the same time, performance in the task is unaffected
by noise. If completing the task is associated with low effort, however, no physiologi-
cal indication of stress under noise can be observed, while performance is significantly
worse. Thus, physiological stress seems to be traded-off for effort and produced only if
needed to compensate for the increased psychological demands from noise in order to
maintain performance. Evidence for the effort-by-stress tradeoff was also found in field
studies on job demand and occupational noise (Evans and Cohen 2004). A second result
where noise was found to cause physiological stress was in the case of chronic exposure:
In studies with children, chronic exposure to aircraft or traffic noise increased cortisol
and epinephrine as well as blood pressure levels, adversely affected psychophysiological,
cognitive, motivational, and affective indices of stress, and led to decreased persistence
in problem solving tasks (Evans et al. 1995, Bullinger et al. 1999, Evans and Cohen
2004).3
Regarding the second part of the hypothesized link between noise, physiological
stress, and cooperation/altruism, evidence is even more sparse. In an early study, Do-
vidio and Morris (1975) show that a high-stress condition leads to increased helping
behavior towards others who share the same stressful situation. They observed less
helping behavior, however, if the potential recipient was in a dissimilar and less stressful
situation.4 To my knowledge, there is only one paper investigating behavior in standard
economic games: von Dawans et al. (2012) show that physiological stress, induced by
a standardized laboratory stressor, is associated with increased pro-social and altruistic
behavior in versions of the trust game and the dictator game. Taking together this
evidence with that on the link between noise and physiological stress described above,
there is reason to expect a positive effect of noise exposure on public good contributions
if one assumes that physiological stress mediates the effect.
In the experiment reported in this paper, treated subjects were exposed to a con-
3Some of these papers experimentally exploited airport openings that corresponded to natural exper-
iments.
4These results found for male subjects were confirmed for female participants by Hayden et al. (1984)
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glomerate of typical urban sounds directly before playing a standard linear public good
game in groups of four players. The data suggest a negative effect of acute noise expo-
sure on public good contributions, compared to an unexposed control group of subjects,
and would thus support the first of the two aforementioned hypotheses. The effect is
statistically significant for certain subgroups among the student subjects, specifically,
Bachelor and Master students, but not for students pursuing other degrees. The effect
is not significantly different between men and women. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to further disentangle the motivational drivers or physiological mediators of
the noise effect, the present study collects some survey-based controls for chronic, acute
pre-experimental, and acute intra-experimental stress as well as for subjects’ history of
chronic and acute pre-experimental noise exposure in order to account for adaptation or
multiple-stressor effects. Most of these variables, in particular chronic stress and noise
history, do not significantly interact with the observed effect of noise. Likewise, there is
no significant evidence for an effort-by-stress trade-off based on these survey measures.
Evidence on an effect from the presence of multiple stressors is mixed, and the possibility
of endogeneity inherent to ex post survey measures cannot be excluded.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. Section
3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Method
Participants Participants were 63 female and 49 male students at Heidelberg Univer-
sity, recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 64 subjects were randomly assigned to the
noise treatment, 48 subjects to the control treatment. The share of females is somewhat
higher in the control treatment (64.6% vs. 50%), which turns out not to be significantly
different using two-sided tests. Half of the subjects majors in an academic subject of
the social sciences (economics, political science, sociology) while the other half majors
in subjects belonging to the humanities, sciences, or another area. Subjects of the social
sciences turn out to be unequally distributed across treatments, with a share of 62.5% in
the noise treatment but only 33.3% in the control group (Table 1). Likewise, differences
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Table 1: Share of students in the social sciences and pursued degrees, by treatments
Major belongs to Degree pursued
social sciences Bachelor Master Staatsexamena Other, or no answer
Noise 62.5% 70.3% 6.3% 18.8% 4.7%
Control 33.3% 43.8% 22.9% 29.2% 4.2%
Notes: a The Staatsexamen is a degree in Germany issued by the government, not the university.
For examples, teachers, lawyers, and medical doctors graduate via Staatsexamen.
exist with respect to the degree pursued. The unequal distributions are likely to be due
to the sample size, as the procedure of matching treatment condition and experimental
sessions was not systematic. The differences can be a problem for simple tests of the
treatment effect if economics students display systematically different behavior, or if
academic maturity matters, and thus calls for an additional regression analysis. Mean
earnings were e 8.40 per subject (SD e 1.01), including a fixed show-up fee of e 3.
Noise treatment In the first part of the experiment, subjects who received the noise
treatment were exposed to 25min of noise at about 65dB(A) on average with bursts at
about 75dB(A) on average.5 The noise was administered through speakers6 (Glass and
Singer 1972, Sherrod and Downs 1974, Tafalla and Evans 1997) placed such that noise
levels were fairly equal across cubicles in the lab. Loudness was measured several times
during exposure.7 The noise was a mixture of typical urban sounds at varying levels
(such as road traffic, aircraft sound, a drilling jackhammer8, a ringing cellphone, and
passing people engaged in a indiscernible chat) which was interrupted by random bursts
of electronic static.9 During exposure, subjects had to perform a paid proofreading task
on four magazine or newspaper articles on various unrelated topics. Payment in this
part was conditioned on performance in the task. The control group performed the
same task for the same time without being exposed to noise. The typical noise level in
5Following the guidelines of the German Association of Otolaryngologists, the noise would not exceed
85dB(A).
6Bose Companion 2.
7Trotec BS15.
8Referential note: “Builders drilling sound” recorded by Koops.
9Cohen (1980) reviews several papers using different types of noise. Results suggest that besides the
uncontrollability of the noise, the unpredictability matters for an effect of intermittent noise samples
while variations in the intensity of the noise matters for an effect of continuous noise samples. The noise
administered in the present experiment combines both types using unpredictable, interrupting bursts
and variations in intensity of the continuous parts.
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the laboratory in sessions in the control treatment was about 45dB(A).
Administering the noise during an unrelated effortful task prior to the public good
game is guided by two findings of the literature. First, there is stronger evidence of
behavioral aftereffects than of simultaneous effects for noise and other environmental
stressors. In Glass and Singer (1972) and Sherrod and Downs (1974), for example,
subjects were confronted with an opportunity to display helping behavior after being
exposed to noise during which they were working on some other task. While performance
in the task did not significantly differ between the treatment and the control group,
differences manifested in the behavior afterwards. This suggests that subjects may adapt
during exposure.10 Glass and Singer (1972) and many replications in the literature (see
Evans and Cohen 2004) found similar behavioral aftereffects for other environmental
stressors and for different tasks following exposure, for instance, persistence in a puzzle
task or performance in a proofreading task. However, the dominance of aftereffects does
not preclude to also find simultaneous effects: For the relevant case of helping behavior,
for example, Page (1977) identifies differences during acute exposure. The second reason
for having subjects solve a cognitively demanding task during noise exposure is to allow
an effort-by-stress tradeoff to manifest, if present. One way to interpret aftereffects is
in the context of behavior that occurs after a daily routine in an exposed environment,
e.g., changes in home life from a noisy working environment (Evans and Cohen 2004).
Public good game The public good game was played directly after the proofreading
task, in groups of four subjects and for ten periods. The game was of the standard
linear type using the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). The choice was framed
as distributing the endowment of 20 “points” of each round (worth e 0.30) between a
“private account” and a “group account”, the latter yielding a marginal per capita return
(MPCR) of 0.4. Matching was constant across rounds (partner treatment) and earnings
of each round added to the final payoff. Instructions included a table illustrating a
subject’s round earnings for various combinations of own and others’ contributions to
10This is in line with others’ findings regarding the effect of simultaneous noise on cognitive performance
(e.g. Hancock and Pierce 1985, Hygge and Knez 2001).
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the group account.11
Questionnaire The experiment concluded with a questionnaire collecting measures
of subjective effort in the proofreading task, perceived stress, history of noise exposure,
and some demographics. The question in which subjects have to rank their effort put in
the proofreading task serves as a control for the presence of physiological stress during
noise exposure (Tafalla and Evans 1997). To control for background levels of chronic
and pre-experimental stress, the questionnaire used the 4-item version of the Perceived
Stress Scale (PSS) by Cohen et al. (1983) as well as a simple question asking for perceived
stress on the same day prior to the experiment, respectively. Questions regarding noise
asked how bothered the subject felt by the experimental noise (Sherrod and Downs
1974) as well as a subjective ranking of the noise exposure on the same day prior to the
experiment, during the past year, and during childhood. Although subjective in nature,
collecting some long-term history of noise exposure can serve as a control for “adaptation
level shifts” through which noise might be perceived less annoying if a subject has a
history of chronic exposure (Berglund et al. 1975, Evans and Cohen 2004). Likewise,
the questions about perceived stress and noise exposure right before the experiment can
serve as controls for the presence of multiple stressors which could increase the effect of
noise due to “diminished coping with multiple stressors” (Evans and Cohen 2004).
Protocol The experiment consisted of seven experimental sessions, conducted in Spring
2013 in the experimental laboratory of the Department of Economics at Heidelberg Uni-
versity, Germany. Each session was scheduled for 1 hour and 15 minutes including seating
and payment, which turned out to be about the time each session took. After seating,
subjects read the instructions (in hardcopy) for both parts of the experiment in private.
The experimenter afterwards paraphrased the important parts of the instructions in a
standardized way, with an emphasis on the understanding of the public good game,
including the payoff table. Subjects had the opportunity to ask questions in private.
When all questions were answered, the texts for the proofreading task were distributed
11See the appendix for the exact wording of the instructions (in German, translation to English
available upon request from the author).
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in hard copy and the experiment started. All other elements of the experiment were
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were
not informed about their earnings in the proofreading task before finishing the end of
the experiment. After finishing the questionnaire, subjects were paid and dismissed.
3 Results
3.1 Nonparametric treatment effects
Before investigating an aftereffect in the public good game, it is meaningful to evaluate
the reception of the noise treatment during exposure. In the proofreading task, subjects’
earnings (which are perfectly collinear to their performance) turn out to be significantly
lower under noise exposure (p < 0.10 in a two-sided Fligner-Policello Robust Rank Order
Test, Fligner and Policello 1981). However, part of the difference can be attributed to a
few subjects12 who missed to enter and confirm the number of mistakes they had counted
into their computer terminals before time ran out, thus earning zero money in the task.13
Interestingly, these instances only occurred in the noise treatment, despite identical oral
warnings prior to beginning the task as well as 60-100 seconds before time was up. If
these subjects are excluded, the difference in performance between the treatment group
and the control group is insignificant (p = 0.57). As mentioned before, both results,
unaffected performance and decreased performance under noise, have been found for
comparable tasks in the literature. At the same time, subjects report to experience
the administered noise as bothersome and disruptive. In the ex post questionnaire, a
majority of treated subjects (61%) chooses one of the upper three categories on a scale of
six answer possibilities to describe their feelings about the noise during the proofreading
task. The six answer categories were presented as ranging from “not bothersome at
all” to “extremely bothersome”. Both results together would suggest the presence of an
effort-by-stress trade-off among those subjects who are unaffected in performance (i.e. do
not miss the timeout) and rate the noise as bothersome, thus the literature would suggest
elevated levels of physiological stress among these subjects to prevent performance losses
128 out of 112.
13The upper right corner of the computer screen displayed a count down for the 25 minutes (in seconds).
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Figure 1: Mean contributions (in experimental points) of subjects in the control group
and the treatment group. Error bars denote standard errors which are clustered at
experimental groups (N = 28).
under noise.
Result 1 Subjects performance in the proofreading task is not significantly different
under noise exposure. However, some treated subjects miss to pay sufficient attention
to the time constraint under noise. The majority of treated subjects rates the noise as
bothersome.
Turning to the aftereffect of noise in the public good game, Figure 1 depicts mean
contributions for the control group and the treatment group. Clearly, average contribu-
tions of those exposed to noise prior to the game seem to be consistently below those
of unexposed subjects. The effect is almost never significant, however, using two-sided
tests, as Table 2 shows. Plausibly, the number of independent observations (28 experi-
mental groups) is too small to identify a roundwise effect. Pooling group means of all
periods would lead to highly significant two-sided test results (p < 0.002).
Result 2 There is tentative nonparametric evidence that public good contribution levels
in the noise treatment are consistently below those in the control treatment.
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Table 2: Significance of the treatment effect
Period
1 2 3 4 5
Mean Noise 9.94 10.26 8.28 7.50 6.55
contri- (1.00) (1.28) (1.27) (1.34) (1.32)
bution Control 11.67 11.83 11.06 9.08 9.33
(points) (1.08) (1.38) (1.51) (1.73) (1.56)
Two-sided (one-
sided) Fligner- U`=1.364 U`=0.875 U`=1.448 U`=0.657 U`=1.519
Policello test (*) (*) (*)
Period
6 7 8 9 10
Mean Noise 5.89 5.65 5.48 5.48 3.44
contri- (1.20) (1.41) (1.51) (1.16) (1.03)
bution Control 9.44 7.98 6.67 6.21 4.52
(points) (1.67) (1.73) (1.86) (1.83) (1.32)
Two-sided (one-
sided) Fligner- U`=2.006** U`=1.229 U`=0.708 U`=0.812 U`=0.774
Policello test (***)
Notes: Mean contribution is the average of the means of the experimental public
good groups. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the group level.
For periods 2-10, the Fligner-Policello tests the equality of the distributions of
the group means. For period 1, the Fligner-Policello tests the equality of the
distributions of the individual contributions. Stars indicate significance levels (*
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
3.2 Regression results
In order to exploit the controls obtained by the questionnaire, and in order to control
for the unequal distributions between the treatment and the control group found for
some demographics, this section presents regression results. Table 3 reports summary
statistics for variables elicited in the questionnaire. The first three variables will be
assumed to proxy for physiological stress, either acute (if subjects rate their day before
the experiment as stressful or if they rate their effort in the proofreading task as high
inducing an effort-by-stress tradeoff) or chronic (as measured by the 4-item PSS). The
next three variables represent subjects’ self-rated history of noise exposure on the ex-
perimental day prior to the experiment, over the past year, and during childhood at the
place they lived most of the time. All but the PSS scale are dummy variables which are
constructed from subjects’ answers on a 6-item rating scale. The second set of variables
are demographic characteristics.
Testing for systematic differences in the distributions of the answer ratings between
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Table 3: Summary statistics of questionnaire variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Pre-experimental stress .5714 .4971 0 1
Effort in part I .6696 .4725 0 1
Chronic stress (4-item PSS) 6.009 3.036 0 15
Pre-experimental noise exposure .6429 .4813 0 1
Chronic noise exposure (past year) .4911 .5022 0 1
Noise exposure in childhood .5446 .5002 0 1
Female .5625 .4983 0 1
Age 22.13 2.625 18 33
Major belongs to the social sciences .5 .5022 0 1
Pursues Bachelor’s degree .5893 .4942 0 1
Pursues Master’s degree .1339 .3421 0 1
Pursues Staatsexamen .2321 .4241 0 1
Pursues other degree / no answer .0446 .2074 0 1
the treatment group and the control group yields some evidence for endogeneity of
the questionnaire responses. While for most variables, significant differences cannot be
established (using a two-sided Fligner-Policello test), for the two questions on noise ex-
posure during the past year and during childhood, subjects in the noise treatment report
significantly lower exposures compared to the control group. The potential presence of
a bias from endogeneity needs to be taken into account when interpreting regression
results.
The econometric specification used in the regressions is
Ci,t = β0 + β1Pi,t + β2Ti,t + β3Si,t + δ1(Ti,t × Si,t)
+β4Hi,t + δ1(Ti,t ×Hi,t) + β5Di,t + δ1(Ti,t ×Di,t)
+β6
∑
−i,t−1C−i,t−1 + β7Ci,t−1
where Ci,t denotes subject i’s contributions in period t, Pi,t denotes a vector of dummy
variables for the experimental periods, Ti,t is the dummy indicating the treatment, Si,t
and Hi,t are the vectors of stress-related and noise-related controls as described above,
Di,t is the vector of demographic controls, and the last two terms represent others’ and
i’s own contributions to the group account in the previous period.
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions.14,15 The first specifica-
14Running random effects GLS panel regressions with period as the time variable yields very similar
results with the same significance levels for all variables.
15Note that due to the small sample size, Table 4 also marks significance levels of below 20% (with
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tion only includes the treatment variable, besides the period dummies. Columns (2) to
(4) each include, in addition, one of the vectors containing variables related to either
stress, noise history, or demographics as well as their interactions with the treatment
variable.16 Column (5) presents the full model. Column (6) corresponds to column (5),
but, in addition, includes the experimental feedback variables for the previous period.
Coefficient estimates for the period dummies and the constant, which are not reported
in Table 4 but included in each specification, confirm a highly significant negative time
trend, as suggested by Figure 1.
Column (1) confirms the insignificant negative treatment effect suggested by the
nonparametric tests in Section 3.1. Controlling for self-reported variables related to
stress in column (2), the results show significantly higher contributions among those
subjects who both report a stressful day and were exposed to the noise. The limited
statistical power of the sample prevents to clearly disentangle whether the interaction
effect is due to a negative main effect of noise among the self-reported unstressed that is
absent among the stressed, or whether the effect is due to a negative main effect of stress
among the control group that is absent among the treated. Taking together the evidence
from all specifications in Table 4 and from additional regressions, there is evidence for
both. In an attempt to explain this finding, it appears that both a negative effect of
noise as well as of stress is intuitive, but the significant absence of the negative effect if
both conditions meet appears counterintuitive. In particular, the negative effect of pre-
experimental stress would be consistent with “diminished coping from multiple stressors”
(Evans and Cohen 2004) but this is inconsistent with un-diminished or even better coping
under pre-experimental stress and noise. A potential explanation for this finding could
be endogeneity of the questionnaire answers, however: If subjects felt tempted to ex post
report a stressful day as an excuse for having given less, then the positive interaction
effect would imply that in the noise treatment, subjects are simply less tempted to use
this excuse and, at the same time, give less because of the noise exposure. Turning to the
one star in parentheses) for illustrative purposes, in order to point out variables that might plausibly
qualify for significance in a larger sample.
16Among the demographic controls, I leave out age due to its small variation in the student sample. If
there are effects, I expect them to be better reflected by the pursued academic degrees which plausibly
proxy for maturity among students.
12
Table 4: OLS coefficient estimates of contributions to the group account
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Noise -2.070 -3.784 -0.638 -5.199* -5.919* -2.316*
(1.789) (2.997) (2.417) (2.736) (3.304) (1.308)
Pre-exper. stress – -1.846(*) – – -1.932(*) -1.529***
(1.238) (1.429) (0.551)
. . . * Noise – 3.489* – – 2.917(*) 2.106***
(1.771) (2.150) (0.704)
Effort in part I – 2.719* – – 2.833(*) 0.728(*)
(1.467) (1.957) (0.486)
. . . * Noise – -1.969 – – -1.608 -0.250
(1.991) (2.623) (0.786)
Chronic stress (PSS) – -0.076 – – -0.088 0.000
(0.218) (0.283) (0.110)
. . . * Noise – 0.158 – – 0.200 0.077
(0.326) (0.367) (0.140)
Pre-exp. noise expos. – – -1.527 – -0.206 0.116
(1.560) (2.279) (0.891)
. . . * Noise – – 1.765 – 0.961 -0.212
(1.802) (2.497) (1.079)
Chronic noise expos. – – 3.397 – 3.236(*) 0.161
(2.617) (2.432) (0.554)
. . . * Noise – – -2.519 – -0.773 0.783
(2.783) (2.762) (0.705)
Noisy childhood – – 0.272 – 0.677 0.496
(1.361) (1.710) (0.610)
. . . * Noise – – -1.410 – -1.455 -0.602
(1.782) (2.073) (0.761)
Female – – – -0.906 -1.164 0.435
(1.157) (1.456) (0.759)
. . . * Noise – – – 0.449 -0.758 -0.368
(1.543) (2.179) (0.891)
Major of the Soc. Sciences – – – -2.494(*) -3.501* -1.341(*)
(1.858) (1.844) (0.817)
. . . * Noise – – – 2.184 3.519(*) 1.437(*)
(2.545) (2.431) (1.040)
Master student – – – -1.697 -2.918** -0.961
(1.822) (1.383) (0.916)
Staatsex. stud. – – – -3.384(*) -3.526(*) -1.094
(2.510) (2.372) (0.858)
Other stud./n.a. – – – -0.906 -2.186 -0.850
(1.743) (1.774) (1.313)
Master * Noise – – – -1.453 0.106 -0.004
(2.193) (2.216) (1.019)
St.-ex. * Noise – – – 6.916** 7.538** 1.520
(3.112) (2.920) (1.167)
Other/n.a. * Noise – – – 6.368** 9.664*** 3.324**
(2.405) (2.888) (1.577)
Others’ contributions – – – – – 0.138***
(0.018)
Own contribution – – – – – 0.465***
(0.047)
N 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1008
# of clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28
R2 0.113 0.140 0.134 0.171 0.227 0.597
Notes: (*) significant at the 20 % level, * at 10 %, ** at 5 %, *** at 1 %. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level and shown in parentheses. All regressions include dummy controls for
experimental periods and a constant. In columns (4)-(6), Bachelor students are the baseline.
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effort in the proofreading task, there is no evidence that treated subjects reporting higher
efforts behave different, potentially from an effort-by-stress tradeoff, as indicated by the
insignificant interaction effect.17 However, all subjects across treatments who report
higher effort also tend to give more to the public good. This could be a manifestation
of an experimenter demand effect. The measure of chronic stress, the PSS, does never
significantly correlate with either contributions or noise. Altogether, the evidence on an
effect of stress in the experiment is mixed and supports careful interpretation of simple
ex post survey measures.
Result 3 Survey measures of chronic stress insignificantly correlate with the both con-
tributions to the public good as well as the effect of noise. Survey measures of acute
pre-experimental or intra-experimental stress provide mixed evidence, and contamina-
tion of questionnaire answers by endogeneity, e.g. from ex-post rationalization or an
experimenter demand effect, cannot be excluded.
Column (3) reveals no significant main or interaction effects of the various types of
self-reported noise exposure in the past. This points against a measurable presence of
“adaptation level shifts” (Evans and Cohen 2004).
Result 4 Regression results do not reveal any effects of the various types of self-reported
past noise exposure on contributions or on the effect of noise on contributions.
Employing demographic controls in column (4) delivers a significantly negative effect of
the noise treatment for the baseline of Bachelor students. The effect persists for Master
students, who do not significantly differ from the baseline, but is offset by a positive
interaction effect of about the same magnitude for Staatsexamen students and for the
residual category of other degrees and non-responding students. In addition, Staatsex-
amen students show tentative evidence for a negative main effect on contributions. As
one would expect, there is (tentative) evidence that students with a major in the social
sciences (mostly economics) give less. Male and female subjects do not significantly dif-
17In a future analysis of the data, a better way to test for a potential effect of an effort-by-stress
tradeoff given the available variables would be to test of different behavior of subjects who (1) were in
the treatment group, (2) reported over-average levels of effort, (3) reported the noise as bothersome, and
(4) did not miss the timeout.
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fer in giving behavior or reception of the treatment in the present sample, as one might
have expected from findings by Epstein and Karlin (1975) for the effect of crowding.
Result 5 Controlling for demographics, noise exposure significantly reduces contribu-
tions among subjects pursuing a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree, but not for other subjects
in the sample. No such differences can be established between male and female subjects.
All effects described above generally persist if we test the full model in column (5), with
slight changes in the significance levels of some variables. Also, the full model adds
(weak) evidence that the significantly negative effect of noise is less received by students
of the social sciences, and that Master students give less in general. The latter effect
can plausibly related to experience or age. The final column (6) conditions contribution
choices on what happened in the previous period. Both experimental feedback variables
are highly significant in explaining behavior in the current period. Including them affects
significance levels of some variables, partly heavily, but does not alter coefficient signs.18
4 Conclusions
Despite a considerable body of literature in other disciplines, for example, environmental
psychology, the effects of environmental stressors have not yet been in the focus of
economists. And rightly so, if environmental stressors are, on aggregate, irrelevant to
economic behavior and decision making. Environmental stressors pose an externality and
source of market failure, however, if their effect is significant, if changes in their levels are
permanent and man-made, and if adaptation is imperfect or costly. This paper provides
evidence for the first of these three conditions. My results suggest a significant adverse
effect of the exposure to acute ambient noise on the extent of voluntary giving to a linear
laboratory public good.
Among the limited related literature, this result confirms findings of a negative effect
of noise on helping behavior (Glass and Singer 1972, Sherrod and Downs 1974, Page 1977,
Moser 1988). The finding supports altruism as the affected motivational transmitter, as
18Again, random effects GLS panel regressions with period as the time variable yield very similar
results.
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altruism is regarded a common motivation for both helping behavior and public good
contributions (Andreoni 2006). In contrast, the result appears not in line with the
hypothesis that physiological stress is the dominant physiological pathway of the noise
effect, since the (sparse) literature suggests a positive effect of physiological stress on
pro-social behavior (Dovidio and Morris 1975, von Dawans et al. 2012). However, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to clearly identify the mediator causing the observed
effect, and alternative hypotheses do exist. For example, risk preferences or cognitive
processing capacities could equally plausible be the affected motivational drivers of public
good giving if subjects perceive the group account as the more risky or more cognitively
demanding option.19 The same argument may hold for the effect on helping behavior
reported in the literature. Likewise, alternative hypotheses besides physiological stress
exist for the physiological transmission of the effect. For example, Page (1977) mentions
stimulus overload, distraction, or escape and avoidance behavior as possible explanations
for the negative effect on helping behavior. These could also be plausibly related to
selfish behavior in cases of social dilemmas. Disentangling these various explanations for
physiological or motivational causes of the effect is left for future research.
The effect of noise found in the present data is an effect of acute, short-term noise
exposure. The extent to which the result may generalize to an environment of chronic
noise exposure, such as urban areas or the vicinity to an airport, depends on adaptation,
as mentioned before. Research on chronic effects naturally poses more difficulties as
the researcher mostly relies on either empirical data or natural experiments. Regarding
adaptation costs, the literature provides some evidence on the costs of adaptation to
permanently increased noise levels. For example, chronic noise was found to adversely
affect auditory discrimination in children and thus, reading acquisition, presumably due
to a habituation of adaptation strategies to cope with chronic exposure (Cohen et al.
1973, Evans et al. 1995, Evans and Cohen 2004). If adaptation to chronically increased
levels incurs significant costs, man-made changes in ambient levels of environmental
stressors such as noise would be sources of relevant externalities in the economy, however.
19Not entirely related to this point, von Dawans et al. (2012) find unaltered propensities to take risks
for higher levels of physiological stress.
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Appendix
Experimental instructions
[Original wording. Translation to English available upon request from the author.]
Willkommen zu diesem Experiment! Bitte lesen Sie diese Anleitung sorgfa¨ltig durch. Nur so
wissen Sie, wie Sie Ihren Verdienst durch Ihre Entscheidungen und Antworten beeinflussen.
Wenn Sie den Instruktionen folgen, ko¨nnen Sie insgesamt einen angemessenen Geldbetrag verdienen.
Dieses Experiment besteht aus zwei Teilen und einem abschließenden Fragebogen. Alle Teil-
nehmer nehmen am gleichen Experiment teil und lesen die gleiche Anleitung wie Sie.
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Ab jetzt und bis zum Ende des Experiments ist es Ihnen untersagt, mit anderen Teilnehmern
zu kommunizieren. Wenn Sie wa¨hrend des Experiments eine Frage haben, heben Sie einfach die
Hand.
Alle Ihre Angaben werden vertraulich behandelt und sind anonym. Das einzige Mal, wo Ihr
Namen und Ihre Adresse beno¨tigt wird, ist auf der Empfangsbesta¨tigung / Quittung der Auszahlung,
die Sie bitte jetzt ausfu¨llen. Tragen Sie dort auch die Computernummer Ihres Sitzplatzes ein, damit
Ihnen Ihr Verdienst nach dem Experiment zugeordnet werden kann. Das Feld fu¨r den Betrag bitte
freilassen.
Um die wissenschaftliche Verwertbarkeit dieses Experiments zu fo¨rdern, treffen Sie alle Ihre
Entscheidungen am besten frei von Mutmaßungen u¨ber den wissenschaftlichen Gegenstand dieses Ex-
periments. Vielen Dank.
Auszahlungen
Wa¨hrend des Experiments spielen Sie um Punkte. Nach dem Experiment werden die Punkte, die
Sie verdient haben, in Euro umgerechnet. Dabei entspricht 1 Punkt = 1,5 Eurocent (0,015 Euro).
Zusa¨tzlich zum variablen Verdienst erhalten Sie eine feste Teilnahmevergu¨tung von 3,00 Euro.
Experiment Teil 1
Wa¨hrend des ersten Teils des Experiments lesen Sie mehrere Texte auf Papier. Jeder Text entha¨lt
Rechtschreib- und Grammatikfehler. Finden und za¨hlen Sie die Fehler, und tragen Sie die An-
zahl in das entsprechende Feld auf dem Computerbildschirm ein. Fu¨r jeden richtig erkannten
Fehler erhalten Sie 5 Punkte. u¨bersteigt die Anzahl der Fehler, die Sie eintragen, die wahre Anzahl
der Fehler im Text, werden Ihnen fu¨r jeden falsch erkannten Fehler wieder 5 Punkte abgezogen. Ihr
Verdienst kann jedoch nicht negativ werden, sondern betra¨gt immer mindestens 0 Punkte.
Beispiel 1: Ein Text entha¨lt 8 Fehler. Sie tragen 5 Fehler ein. Sie erhalten 25 Punkte.
Beispiel 2: Ein Text entha¨lt 8 Fehler. Sie tragen 10 Fehler ein. Sie erhalten 30 Punkte.
Beispiel 3: Ein Text entha¨lt 8 Fehler. Sie tragen 30 Fehler ein. Sie erhalten 0 Punkte.
[Only the treatment group saw the following paragraph:] Wa¨hrend dieses Teils des Experiments
wird der Raum mit Gera¨uschen beschallt. Der Pegel der Gera¨usche ist dabei stets gesundheitlich
unbedenklich und entspricht Pegeln, denen Sie auch im Alltag begegnen.
Experiment Teil 2
Der zweite Teil des Experiments besteht aus 10 Runden. Zu Beginn des zweiten Teils werden
Sie u¨ber Computer per Zufallsauswahl mit drei anderen Teilnehmern/-innen im Raum zu einer
Gruppe zusammengeschaltet. Keiner der Gruppenmitglieder kennt die Identita¨t der anderen
Gruppenmitglieder; sie wird auch nach dem Experiment nicht offengelegt. Ihr Verdienst in diesem Teil
wird sowohl durch Ihre eigenen Entscheidungen als auch durch die Entscheidungen der anderen
Teilnehmer in Ihrer Gruppe beeinflusst.
In jeder Runde sind Sie und die anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe mit der gleichen Entscheidungssi-
tuation konfrontiert: Jede(r) bekommt 20 Punkte zur Verfu¨gung gestellt und entscheidet, wie sie
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oder er diese auf zwei Alternativen verteilen mo¨chte. Die beiden Alternativen sind ein privates
Punktekonto und ein gemeinsames Konto Ihrer Gruppe.
• Privates Konto: Jeder Punkt, den Sie Ihrem privaten Konto zuteilen, erho¨ht (ausschließlich)
Ihren eigenen Punkteverdienst, und zwar um 1 Punkt.
• Gruppenkonto: Jeder Punkt, den Sie dem Gruppenkonto zuordnen, erho¨ht den Punkteverdienst
bei allen Mitgliedern der Gruppe, inklusive Ihnen, und zwar um 0,4 Punkte. Gleiches gilt,
wenn ein anderes Mitglied Ihrer Gruppe Punkte dem Gruppenkonto zuteilt: Jeder Punkt erho¨ht
den Verdienst bei allen in der Gruppe um 0,4 Punkte.
Ihr perso¨nlicher Verdienst pro Runde la¨sst sich nach diesen Regeln wie folgt zusammenfassen:
Ihr Verdienst pro Runde = Ihre Zuteilung zum privaten Konto + 0,4 x Summe der Beitra¨ge aller
Gruppenmitglieder zum Gruppenkonto
Bitte beachten Sie, dass Ihnen der Einfachheit halber auf dem Computerbildschirm nur ein Feld
zum Eintragen von Punkten gezeigt wird. Dort tragen Sie ein, wie viele der 20 Punkte Sie dem Grup-
penkonto zuweisen mo¨chten. Alle u¨brigen Punkte, die Sie nicht dem Gruppenkonto zuteilen, werden
dann automatisch dem privaten Konto zugeteilt.
Beispiel: Angenommen, Sie behalten 10 Punkte fu¨r das private Konto und tragen 10 Punkte in
das Feld fu¨r das Gruppenkonto ein. Ferner sei angenommen, die anderen Gruppenmitglieder tragen
ebenfalls zum Gruppenkonto bei. Nehmen wir an, insgesamt kommen auf dem Gruppenkonto 40 Punkte
zusammen. Diese 40 Punkte bewirken eine Auszahlung von 0,4 x 40 = 16 Punkte fu¨r jeden in der
Gruppe. Ihr eigener Verdienst betra¨gt also die 16 Punkte vom Gruppenkonto und die 10 Punkte auf
Ihrem privaten Konto = 26 Punkte.
Die Tabelle auf Seite 3 gibt eine u¨bersicht u¨ber Ihren Verdienst fu¨r einige beispielhafte Kombi-
nationen wieder. Sie lesen die Tabelle wie folgt: Zeilen stehen fu¨r Beispiele, wie viele Punkte Sie
dem Gruppenkonto zuteilen (also zwischen 0 und 20). Spalten stehen fu¨r Beispiele, wie viele Punkte
die anderen drei Gruppenmitglieder insgesamt auf das Gruppenkonto einzahlen (also zwischen 0
und 60). Jede Zelle gibt Ihren perso¨nlichen Rundenverdienst wieder, der sich wie oben beschrieben
berechnet. Bitte vergewissern Sie sich jetzt, dass Sie die Tabelle vollsta¨ndig verstehen. Zo¨gern Sie nicht,
die Hand zu heben, wenn Sie eine Frage haben.
Vor jeder neuen Runde werden Ihnen Informationen u¨ber die vergangene Runde angezeigt,
und zwar u¨ber:
• Ihren eigenen Beitrag zum Gruppenkonto, den Sie in das Feld auf dem Bildschirm eingegeben
haben,
• die Summe der Punkte aller vier Gruppenmitglieder auf dem Gruppenkonto,
• Ihren Verdienst in der vergangenen Runde, der sich aus diesen Entscheidungen ergibt.
Fragebogen
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Das Experiment endet mit einem Fragebogen, wa¨hrenddessen Ihre Auszahlung vorbereitet wird. Die
Antworten auf Fragen im Fragebogen geben Sie am besten spontan, ohne lange und wiederholt daru¨ber
nachzudenken.
Danke fu¨r Ihre Teilnahme!
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